Noam Chomky
You
all know, of course, there was an election—what is called “an election” in the
United States—last November. There was really one issue in the election, what to
do about U.S. forces in Iraq and there was, by U.S. standards, an overwhelming
vote calling for a withdrawal of U.S. forces on a firm timetable.
As few people know, a couple of months earlier there were extensive polls in
Iraq, U.S.-run polls, with interesting results. They were not secret here. If
you really looked you could find references to them, so it’s not that they were
concealed. This poll found that two-thirds of the people in Baghdad wanted the
U.S. troops out immediately; the rest of the country—a large majority—wanted a
firm timetable for withdrawal, most of them within a year or less.
The figures are higher for Arab Iraq in the areas where troops were actually
deployed. A very large majority felt that the presence of U.S. forces increased
the level of violence and a remarkable 60 percent for all of Iraq, meaning
higher in the areas where the troops are deployed, felt that U.S. forces were
legitimate targets of attack. So there was a considerable consensus between
Iraqis and Americans on what should be done in Iraq, namely troops should be
withdrawn either immediately or with a firm timetable.
Well, the reaction in the post-election U.S. government to that consensus was to
violate public opinion and increase the troop presence by maybe 30,000 to
50,000. Predictably, there was a pretext announced. It was pretty obvious what
it was going to be. “There is outside interference in Iraq, which we have to
defend the Iraqis against. The Iranians are interfering in Iraq.” Then came the
alleged evidence about finding IEDs, roadside bombs with Iranian markings, as
well as Iranian forces in Iraq. “What can we do? We have to escalate to defend
Iraq from the outside intervention.”
Then came the “debate.” We are a free and open society, after all, so we have
“lively” debates. On the one side were the hawks who said, “The Iranians are
interfering, we have to bomb them.” On the other side were the doves who said,
“We cannot be sure the evidence is correct, maybe you misread the serial numbers
or maybe it is just the revolutionary guards and not the government.”
So we had the usual kind of debate going on, which illustrates a very important
and pervasive distinction between several types of propaganda systems. To take
the ideal types, exaggerating a little: totalitarian states’ propaganda is that
you better accept it, or else. And “or else” can be of various consequences,
depending on the nature of the state. People can actually believe whatever they
want as long as they obey. Democratic societies use a different method: they
don’t articulate the party line. That’s a mistake. What they do is presuppose
it, then encourage vigorous debate within the framework of the party line. This
serves two purposes. For one thing it gives the impression of a free and open
society because, after all, we have lively debate. It also instills a propaganda
line that becomes something you presuppose, like the air you breathe.
That was the case here. This is a classic illustration. The whole debate about
the Iranian “interference” in Iraq makes sense only on one assumption, namely,
that “we own the world.” If we own the world, then the only question that can
arise is that someone else is interfering in a country we have invaded and
occupied.
So if you look over the debate that took place and is still taking place about
Iranian interference, no one points out this is insane. How can Iran be
interfering in a country that we invaded and occupied? It’s only appropriate on
the presupposition that we own the world. Once you have that established in your
head, the discussion is perfectly sensible.
You read a lot of comparisons now about Vietnam and Iraq. For the most part they
are totally incomparable; the nature and purpose of the war, almost everything
is totally different except in one respect: how they are perceived in the United
States. In both cases there is what is now sometimes called the “Q” word,
quagmire. Is it a quagmire? In Vietnam it is now recognized that it was a
quagmire. There is a debate of whether Iraq, too, is a quagmire. In other words,
is it costing us too much? That is the question you can debate.
So in the case of Vietnam, there was a debate. Not at the beginning—in fact,
there was so little discussion in the beginning that nobody even remembers when
the war began—1962, if you’re interested. That’s when the U.S. attacked Vietnam.
But there was no discussion, no debate, nothing.
By the mid-1960s, mainstream debate began. And it was the usual range of
opinions between the hawks and the doves. The hawks said if we send more troops,
we can win. The doves, well, Arthur Schlesinger, famous historian, Kennedy’s
advisor, in his book in 1966 said that we all pray that the hawks will be right
and that the current escalation of troops, which by then was approaching half a
million, will work and bring us victory. If it does, we will all be praising the
wisdom and statesmanship of the American government for winning victory—in a
land that we’re reducing to ruin and wreck.
You can translate that word by word to the doves today. We all pray that the
surge will work. If it does, contrary to our expectations, we will be praising
the wisdom and statesmanship of the Bush administration in a country, which, if
we’re honest, is a total ruin, one of the worst disasters in military history
for the population.
If you get way to the left end of mainstream discussion, you get somebody like
Anthony Lewis who, at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, wrote in retrospect
that the war began with benign intensions to do good; that is true by
definition, because it’s us, after all. So it began with benign intentions, but
by 1969, he said, it was clear that the war was a mistake. For us to win a
victory would be too costly—for us—so it was a mistake and we should withdraw.
That was the most extreme criticism.
Very much like today. We could withdraw from Vietnam because the U.S. had
already essentially obtained its objective by then. Iraq we can’t because we
haven’t obtained our objectives.
And for those of you who are old enough to remember—or have read about it—you
will note that the peace movement pretty much bought that line. Just like the
mainstream discussion, the opposition of the war, including the peace movement,
was mostly focused on the bombing of the North. When the U.S. started bombing
the North regularly in February 1965, it also escalated the bombing of the South
to triple the scale—and the South had already been attacked for three years by
then. A couple of hundred thousand South Vietnamese were killed and thousands,
if not tens of the thousands, had been driven into concentration camps. The U.S.
had been carrying out chemical warfare to destroy food crops and ground cover.
By 1965 South Vietnam was already a total wreck.
Bombing the South was costless for the United States because the South had no
defense. Bombing the North was costly—you bomb the North, you bomb the harbor,
you might hit Russian ships, which begins to become dangerous. You’re bombing an
internal Chinese railroad—the Chinese railroads from southeast to southwest
China happen to go through North Vietnam—who knows what they might do.
In fact, the Chinese were accused, correctly, of sending Chinese forces into
Vietnam, namely to rebuild the railroad that we were bombing. So that was
“interference” with our divine right to bomb North Vietnam. So most of the focus
was on the bombing of the North. The peace movement slogan, “Stop the bombing”
meant the bombing of the North.
In 1967 the leading specialist on Vietnam, Bernard Fall, a military historian
and the only specialist on Vietnam respected by the U.S. government—who was a
hawk, incidentally, but who cared about the Vietnamese—wrote that it’s a
question of whether Vietnam will survive as a cultural and historical entity
under the most severe bombing that has ever been applied to a country this size.
He was talking about the South. He kept emphasizing it was the South that was
being attacked. But that didn’t matter because it was costless, therefore it’s
fine to continue. That is the range of debate, which only makes sense on the
assumption that we own the world.
If you read, say, the Pentagon Papers, it turns out there was extensive planning
about the bombing of the North—very detailed, meticulous planning on just how
far it can go, what happens if we go a little too far, and so on. There is no
discussion at all about the bombing of the South, virtually none. Just an
occasional announcement, okay, we will triple the bombing, or something like
that.
If you read Robert McNamara’s memoirs of the war—by that time he was considered
a leading dove—he reviews the meticulous planning about the bombing of the
North, but does not even mention his decision to sharply escalate the bombing of
the South at the same time that the bombing of the North was begun.
I should say, incidentally, that with regard to Vietnam what I have been
discussing is articulate opinion, including the leading part of the peace
movement. There is also public opinion, which it turns out is radically
different, and that is of some significance. By 1969 around 70 percent of the
public felt that the war was not a mistake, but that it was fundamentally wrong
and immoral. That was the wording of the polls and that figure remains fairly
constant up until the most recent polls just a few years ago. The figures are
pretty remarkable because people who say that in a poll almost certainly think,
I must be the only person in the world that thinks this. They certainly did not
read it anywhere, they did not hear it anywhere. But that was popular opinion.
The same is true with regard to many other issues. But for articulate opinion
it’s pretty much the way I’ve described—largely vigorous debate between the
hawks and the doves, all on the unexpressed assumption that we own the world. So
the only thing that matters is how much is it costing us, or maybe for some more
humane types, are we harming too many of them?
Getting
back to the election, there was a lot of disappointment among anti-war
people—the majority of the population—that Congress did not pass any withdrawal
legislation. There was a Democratic resolution that was vetoed, but if you look
at the resolution closely it was not a withdrawal resolution. There was a good
analysis of it by General Kevin Ryan, who was a fellow at the Kennedy School at
Harvard. He went through it and he said it really should be called a re-missioning
proposal. It leaves about the same number of American troops, but they have a
slightly different mission.
He said, first of all it allows for a national security exception. If the
president says there is a national security issue, he can do whatever he
wants—end of resolution. The second gap is it allows for anti-terrorist
activities. Okay, that is whatever you like. Third, it allows for training Iraqi
forces. Again, anything you like.
Next it says troops have to remain for protection of U.S. forces and facilities.
What are U.S. forces? Well, U.S. forces are those embedded in Iraqi armed units
where 60 percent of their fellow soldiers think that they—U.S. troops, that
is—are legitimate targets of attack. Incidentally, those figures keep going up,
so they are probably higher by now. Well, okay, that is plenty of force
protection. What facilities need protection was not explained in the Democratic
resolution, but facilities include what is called “the embassy.” The U.S.
embassy in Iraq is nothing like any embassy that has ever existed in history.
It’s a city inside the green zone, the protected region of Iraq, that the U.S.
runs. It’s got everything from missiles to McDonalds, anything you want. They
didn’t build that huge facility because they intend to leave.
That is one facility, but there are others. There are “semi-permanent military
bases,” which are being built around the country. “Semi-permanent” means
permanent, as long as we want.
General Ryan omitted a lot of things. He omitted the fact that the U.S. is
maintaining control of logistics and logistics is the core of a modern Army.
Right now about 80 percent of the supply is coming in though the south, from
Kuwait, and it’s going through guerilla territory, easily subject to attack,
which means you have to have plenty of troops to maintain that supply line.
Plus, of course, it keeps control over the Iraqi Army.
The Democratic resolution excludes the Air Force. The Air Force does whatever it
wants. It is bombing pretty regularly and it can bomb more intensively. The
resolution also excludes mercenaries, which is no small number—sources such as
the Wall Street Journal estimate the number of mercenaries at about 130,000,
approximately the same as the number of troops, which makes some sense. The
traditional way to fight a colonial war is with mercenaries, not with your own
soldiers—that is the French Foreign Legion, the British Ghurkas, or the Hessians
in the Revolutionary War. That is part of the main reason the draft was
dropped—so you get professional soldiers, not people you pick off the streets.
So, yes, it is re-missioning, but the resolution was vetoed because it was too
strong, so we don’t even have that. And, yes, that did disappoint a lot of
people. However, it would be too strong to say that no high official in
Washington called for immediate withdrawal. There were some. The strongest one I
know of—when asked what is the solution to the problem in Iraq—said it’s quite
obvious, “Withdraw all foreign forces and withdraw all foreign arms.” That
official was Condoleeza Rice and she was not referring to U.S. forces, she was
referring to Iranian forces and Iranian arms. And that makes sense, too, on the
assumption that we own the world because, since we own the world U.S. forces
cannot be foreign forces anywhere. So if we invade Iraq or Canada, say, we are
the indigenous forces. It’s the Iranians that are foreign forces.
I
waited for a while to see if anyone, at least in the press or journals, would
point out that there was something funny about this. I could not find a word. I
think everyone regarded that as a perfectly sensible comment. But I could not
see a word from anyone who said, wait a second, there are foreign forces there,
150,000 American troops, plenty of American arms.
So it is reasonable that when British sailors were captured in the Gulf by
Iranian forces, there was debate, “Were they in Iranian borders or in Iraqi
borders? Actually there is no answer to this because there is no territorial
boundary, and that was pointed out. It was taken for granted that if the British
sailors were in Iraqi waters, then Iran was guilty of a crime by intervening in
foreign territory. But Britain is not guilty of a crime by being in Iraqi
territory, because Britain is a U.S. client state, and we own the world, so they
are there by right.
What about the possible next war, Iran? There have been very
credible threats by the U.S. and Israel—essentially a U.S. client—to attack
Iran. There happens to be something called the UN Charter which says that—in
Article 2—the threat or use of force in international affairs is a crime.
“Threat or use of force.”
Does anybody care? No, because we’re an outlaw state by definition, or to be
more precise, our threats and use of force are not foreign, they’re indigenous
because we own the world. Therefore, it’s fine. So there are threats to bomb
Iran—maybe we will and maybe we won’t. That is the debate that goes on. Is it
legitimate if we decide to do it? People might argue it’s a mistake. But does
anyone say it would be illegitimate? For example, the Democrats in Congress
refuse to put in an amendment that would require the Executive to inform
Congress if it intends to bomb Iran—to consult, inform. Even that was not
accepted.
The whole world is aghast at this possibility. It would be monstrous. A leading
British military historian, Correlli Barnett, wrote recently that if the U.S.
does attack, or Israel does attack, it would be World War III. The attack on
Iraq has been horrendous enough. Apart from devastating Iraq, the UN High
Commission on Refugees reviewed the number of displaced people—they estimate 4.2
million, over 2 million fled the country, another 2 million fleeing within the
country. That is in addition to the numbers killed, which if you extrapolate
from the last studies, are probably approaching a million.
It was anticipated by U.S. intelligence and other intelligence agencies and
independent experts that an attack on Iraq would probably increase the threat of
terror and nuclear proliferation. But that went way beyond what anyone expected.
Well known terrorism specialists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank
estimated—using mostly government statistics—that what they call “the Iraq
effect” increased terror by a factor of seven, and that is pretty serious. And
that gives you an indication of the ranking of protection of the population in
the priority list of leaders. It’s very low.
So what would the Iran effect be? Well, that is incalculable. It could be World
War III. Very likely a massive increase in terror, who knows what else. Even in
the states right around Iraq, which don’t like Iran—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey—even there the large majority would prefer to see a nuclear armed Iran to
any U.S. military action, and they are right, military action could be
devastating. It doesn’t mean we won’t do it. There is very little discussion
here of the illegitimacy of doing it, again on the assumption that anything we
do is legitimate, it just might cost too much.
Is there a possible solution to the U.S./Iran crisis? Well, there are some
plausible solutions. One possibility would be an agreement that allows Iran to
have nuclear energy, like every signer of the non-proliferation treaty, but not
to have nuclear weapons. In addition, it would call for a nuclear weapons free
zone in the Middle East. That would include Iran, Israel, which has hundreds of
nuclear weapons, and any U.S. or British forces deployed in the region. A third
element of a solution would be for the United States and other nuclear states to
obey their legal obligation, by unanimous agreement of the World Court, to make
good-faith moves to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.
Is this feasible? Well, it’s feasible on one assumption, that the United States
and Iran become functioning democratic societies, because what I have just
quoted happens to be the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the populations
in Iran and the United States. On everything that I mentioned there is an
overwhelming majority. So, yes, there would be a very feasible solution if these
two countries were functioning democratic societies, meaning societies in which
public opinion has some kind of effect on policy. The problem in the United
States is the inability of organizers to do something in a population that
overwhelmingly agrees with them and to make that current policy. Of course, it
can be done. Peasants in Bolivia can do it, we can obviously do it here.
Can we do anything to make Iran a more democratic society? Not directly, but
indirectly we can. We can pay attention to the dissidents and the reformists in
Iran who are struggling courageously to turn Iran into a more democratic
society. And we know exactly what they are saying, they are very outspoken about
it. They are pleading with the United States to withdraw the threats against
Iran. The more we threaten Iran, the more we give a gift to the reactionary,
religious fanatics in the government. You make threats, you strengthen them.
That is exactly what is happening. The threats have lead to repression,
predictably.

Now the Americans claim they are
outraged by the repression, which we should protest, but we should recognize
that the repression is the direct and predictable consequence of the actions
that the U.S. government is taking. So if you take actions, and then they have
predictable consequences, condemning the consequences is total hypocrisy.
Incidentally, in the case of Cuba about two-thirds of Americans think we ought
to end the embargo and all threats and enter into diplomatic relations. And that
has been true ever since polls have been taken—for about 30 years. The figure
varies, but it’s roughly there. Zero effect on policy, in Iran, Cuba, and
elsewhere.
So there is a problem and that problem is that the United States is just not a
functioning democracy. Public opinion does not matter and among articulate and
elite opinion that is a principle—it shouldn’t matter. The only principle that
matters is we own the world and the rest of you shut up, you know, whether
you’re abroad or at home.
So, yes, there is a potential solution to the very dangerous problem, it’s
essentially the same solution: do something to turn our own country into a
functioning democracy. But that is in radical opposition to the fundamental
presupposition of all elite discussions, mainly that we own the world and that
these questions don’t arise and the public should have no opinion on foreign
policy, or any policy.
Once, when I was driving to work, I was listening to NPR. NPR
is supposed to be the kind of extreme radical end of the spectrum. I read a
statement somewhere, I don’t know if it’s true, but it was a quote from Obama,
who is the hope of the liberal doves, in which he allegedly said that the
spectrum of discussion in the United States extends between two crazy extremes,
Rush Limbaugh and NPR. The truth, he said, is in the middle and that is where he
is going to be, in the middle, between the crazies.
NPR then had a discussion—it was like being at the Harvard faculty club—serious
people, educated, no grammatical errors, who know what they’re talking about,
usually polite. The discussion was about the so-called missile defense system
that the U.S. is trying to place in Czechoslovakia and Poland—and the Russian
reaction. The main issue was, “What is going on with the Russians? Why are they
acting so hostile and irrational? Are they trying to start a new Cold War? There
is something wrong with those guys. Can we calm them down and make them less
paranoid?”
The main specialist they called in, I think from the Pentagon or somewhere,
pointed out, accurately, that a missile defense system is essentially a
first-strike weapon. That is well known by strategic analysts on all sides. If
you think about it for a minute, it’s obvious why. A missile defense system is
never going to stop a first strike, but it could, in principle, if it ever
worked, stop a retaliatory strike. If you attack some country with a first
strike, and practically wipe it out, if you have a missile defense system, and
prevent them from retaliating, then you would be protected, or partially
protected. If a country has a functioning missile defense system it will have
more options for carrying out a first strike. Okay, obvious, and not a secret.
It’s known to every strategic analyst. I can explain it to my grandchildren in
two minutes and they understand it.
So on NPR it is agreed that a missile defense system is a first-strike weapon.
But then comes the second part of the discussion. Well, say the pundits, the
Russians should not be worried about this. For one thing because it’s not enough
of a system to stop their retaliation, so therefore it’s not yet a first-strike
weapon against them. Then they said it is kind of irrelevant anyway because it
is directed against Iran, not against Russia.
Okay, that was the end of the discussion. So, point one, missile defense is a
first-strike weapon; second, it’s directed against Iran. Now, you can carry out
a small exercise in logic. Does anything follow from those two assumptions? Yes,
what follows is it’s a first-strike weapon against Iran. Since the U.S. owns the
world what could be wrong with having a first-strike weapon against Iran. So the
conclusion is not mentioned. It is not necessary. It follows from the fact that
we own the world.
Maybe a year ago or so, Germany sold advanced submarines to Israel, which were
equipped to carry missiles with nuclear weapons. Why does Israel need submarines
with nuclear armed missiles? Well, there is only one imaginable reason and
everyone in Germany with a brain must have understood that—certainly their
military system does—it’s a first-strike weapon against Iran. Israel can use
German subs to illustrate to Iranians that if they respond to an Israeli attack
they will be vaporized.
The fundamental premises of Western imperialism are extremely deep. The West
owns the world and now the U.S. runs the West, so, of course, they go along. The
fact that they are providing a first-strike weapon for attacking Iran probably,
I’m guessing now, raised no comment because why should it?
You can forget about history, it does not matter, it’s kind of
“old fashioned,” boring stuff we don’t need to know about. But most countries
pay attention to history. So, for example, for the United States there is no
discussion of the history of U.S./Iranian relations. Well, for the U.S. there is
only one event in Iranian history—in 1979 Iranians overthrew the tyrant that the
U.S. was backing and took some hostages for over a year. That happened and they
had to be punished for that.
But for Iranians their history is that for over 50 years, literally without a
break, the U.S. has been torturing Iranians. In 1953 the U.S. overthrew the
parliamentary government and installed a brutal tyrant, the Shah, and kept
supporting him while he compiled one of the worst human rights records in the
world—torture, assassination, anything you like. In fact, President Carter, when
he visited Iran in December 1978, praised the Shah because of the love shown to
him by his people, and so on and so forth, which probably accelerated the
overthrow. Of course, Iranians have this odd way of remembering what happened to
them and who was behind it. When the Shah was overthrown, the Carter
administration immediately tried to instigate a military coup by sending arms to
Iran through Israel to try to support military force to overthrow the
government. We immediately turned to supporting Iraq, that is Saddam Hussein,
and his invasion of Iran.
Saddam was executed for crimes he committed in 1982, by his standards not very
serious crimes—complicity in killing 150 people. Well, there was something
missing in that account—1982 is a very important year in U.S./Iraqi relations.
That is the year in which Ronald Reagan removed Iraq from the list of states
supporting terrorism so that the U.S. could start supplying Iraq with weapons
for its invasion of Iran, including the means to develop weapons of mass
destruction, chemical and nuclear weapons. That is 1982. A year later Donald
Rumsfeld was sent to firm up the deal. Well, Iranians may very well remember
that this led to a war in which hundreds of thousands of them were slaughtered
with U.S. aid going to Iraq. They may well remember that the year after the war
was over, in 1989, the U.S. government invited Iraqi nuclear engineers to come
to the United States for advanced training in developing nuclear weapons.
What about the Russians? They have a history too. One part of the history is
that in the last century Russia was invaded and practically destroyed three
times through Eastern Europe. You can look back and ask, when was the last time
that the U.S. was invaded and practically destroyed through Canada or Mexico?
That doesn’t happen. We crush others and we are always safe. But the Russians
don’t have that luxury. Now, in 1990 a remarkable event took place. I was kind
of shocked, frankly. Gorbachev agreed to let Germany be unified, meaning join
the West and be militarized within a hostile military alliance. This is Germany,
which twice in that century practically destroyed Russia. That’s a pretty
remarkable agreement.
There was a quid pro quo. Then-president George Bush I agreed that NATO would
not expand to the East. The Russians also demanded, but did not receive, an
agreement for a nuclear-free zone from the Artic to the Baltic, which would give
them a little protection from nuclear attack. That was the agreement in 1990.
Then Bill Clinton came into office, the so-called liberal. One of the first
things he did was to rescind the agreement, unilaterally, and expand NATO to the
East.
For the Russians that’s pretty serious, if you remember the history. They lost
25 million people in the last World War and over 3 million in World War I. But
since the U.S. owns the world, if we want to threaten Russia, that is fine. It
is all for freedom and justice, after all, and if they make unpleasant noises
about it we wonder why they are so paranoid. Why is Putin screaming as if we’re
somehow threatening them, since we can’t be threatening anyone, owning the
world.
One of the other big issues on the front pages now is Chinese “aggressiveness.”
There is a lot of concern about the fact that the Chinese are building up their
missile forces. Is China planning to conquer the world? Big debates about it.
Well, what is really going on? For years China has been in the lead in trying to
prevent the militarization of space. If you look at the debates and the
Disarmament Commission of the UN General Assembly, the votes are 160 to 1 or 2.
The U.S. insists on the militarization of space. It will not permit the outer
space treaty to explicitly bar military relations in space.
Clinton’s position was that the U.S. should control space for military purposes.
The Bush administration is more extreme. Their position is the U.S. should own
space, their words, We have to own space for military purposes. So that is the
spectrum of discussion here. The Chinese have been trying to block it and that
is well understood. You read the most respectable journal in the world, I
suppose, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and you find
leading strategic analysts, John Steinbrunner and Nancy Gallagher, a couple of
years ago, warning that the Bush administration’s aggressive militarization is
leading to what they call “ultimate doom.” Of course, there is going to be a
reaction to it. You threaten people with destruction, they are going to react.
These analysts call on peace-loving nations to counter Bush’s aggressive
militarism. They hope that China will lead peace-loving nations to counter U.S.
aggressiveness. It’s a pretty remarkable comment on the impossibility of
achieving democracy in the United States. Again, the logic is pretty elementary.
Steinbrunner and Gallagher are assuming that the United States cannot be a
democratic society; it’s not one of the options, so therefore we hope that maybe
China will do something.
Well, China finally did something. It signaled to the United States that they
noticed that we were trying to use space for military purposes, so China shot
down one of their satellites. Everyone understands why—the mili- tarization and
weaponization of space depends on satellites. While missiles are very difficult
or maybe impossible to stop, satellites are very easy to shoot down. You know
where they are. So China is saying, “Okay, we understand you are militarizing
space. We’re going to counter it not by militarizing space, we can’t compete
with you that way, but by shooting down your satellites.” That is what was
behind the satellite shooting. Every military analyst certainly understood it
and every lay person can understand it. But take a look at the debate. The
discussion was about, “Is China trying it conquer the world by shooting down one
of its own satellites?”
About a year ago there was a new rash of articles and headlines on the front
page about the “Chinese military build-up.” The Pentagon claimed that China had
increased its offensive military capacity—with 400 missiles, which could be
nuclear armed. Then we had a debate about whether that proves China is trying to
conquer the world or the numbers are wrong, or something.
Just a little footnote. How many offensive nuclear armed missiles does the
United States have? Well, it turns out to be 10,000. China may now have maybe
400, if you believe the hawks. That proves that they are trying to conquer the
world.
It turns out, if you read the international press closely, that the reason China
is building up its military capacity is not only because of U.S. aggressiveness
all over the place, but the fact that the United States has improved its
targeting capacities so it can now destroy missile sites in a much more
sophisticated fashion wherever they are, even if they are mobile. So who is
trying to conquer the world? Well, obviously the Chinese because since we own
it, they are trying to conquer it.
It’s all too easy to continue with this indefinitely. Just pick your topic. It’s
a good exercise to try. This simple principle, “we own the world,” is sufficient
to explain a lot of the discussion about foreign affairs.
I will just finish with a word from George Orwell. In the introduction to Animal
Farm he said, England is a free society, but it’s not very different from the
totalitarian monster I have been describing. He says in England unpopular ideas
can be suppressed without the use of force. Then he goes on to give some dubious
examples. At the end he turns to a very brief explanation, actually two
sentences, but they are to the point. He says, one reason is the press is owned
by wealthy men who have every reason not to want certain ideas to be expressed.
And the second reason—and I think a more important one—is a good education. If
you have gone to the best schools and graduated from Oxford and Cambridge, and
so on, you have instilled in you the understanding that there are certain things
it would not do to say; actually, it would not do to think. That is the primary
way to prevent unpopular ideas from being expressed.
The ideas of the overwhelming majority of the population, who don’t attend
Harvard, Princeton, Oxford and Cambridge, enable them to react like human
beings, as they often do. There is a lesson there for activists.